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right to make any investments; he will only be liable for the losses which
were occasioned by investments which would not, at the time of the investment, have been made by a prudent investor, not in regard to speculation,
but in regard to the permanent disposition of the funds, considering the
probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital.38
The fallacy of the present investment laws in Wyoming may best be
summarized by the following statement. There is no man or group of men
presently alive who can be certain, at any point in human history, which
investment is likely to be sound and which unsound; or which investment
will continue to produce reasonable income and which not; therefore, any
attempt to freeze an authorized list of investments is doomed to disappointment.
WADE BRoRBY

THE CONCEPT OF GOOD FAITH BARGAINING UNDER
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947
The National Labor Relations Act of 1947, more commonly referred
to as the Taft-Hartley Act, describes unfair labor practices of both employers and labor organizations in Section 8. After setting out activities
that constitute such practices the following provision outlines the statutory
duty to bargain collectively:
...to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet at reasonabfe times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession ....

I

The primary objective of our national labor policy is to promote
industrial peace by encouraging the practice of collective bargaining. This
objective was first developed under the original National Labor Relations
Act of 1935 and it continues in the 1947 amendment to the Act. To best
describe this theory of successful labor-management negotiation, -it is
appropriate that we examine the legal requirements of bargaining collectively. A more thorough examination can be achieved by first giving
content to the phrase, "to .

.

. confer in good faith."

DUTY TO COLLECTIVELY BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH
If collective bargaining were to aid in resolving industrial strife and
eliminating costly strikes, some requirement of good faith was necessary.
HISTORY OF THE

33.
1.

Harvard College v. Armory, 9 Pick, 446 (Mass. 1830).
Act of June 23, 1947, c. 120, § 8 (d), 61 Stat. 142, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952 ed.).

NOTES

The duty to bargain first took statutory form in the Transportation
Act of 1920 in which there was a duty on the part of "all carriers and their
officers and employees ...

to exert every reasonable effort" to resolve their

disputes in conference.2 The first glimmer of an idea of good faith was
nurtured by this Act as interpreted by the Railroad Labor Board when it
proposed that:
Naked presentations as irreducible demands of elaborate
wage scales carrying substantial increases, or voluminous forms of
contract regulating working conditions, with instructions to sign
on the dotted line, is not a performance of the obligation to decide
disputes in conference if possible. The statute requires an honest
effort by the parties to decide in conference.3
The National Labor Board, created in August, 1933, determined that
there was a reciprocal duty to bargain and that the duty included more
than the bare requirement that the employer meet and confer with the
employee representative. Prior to this time, when the employee representative was engaged in bargaining, it was often in a precarious bargaining
position whereby it could be "talked to death" by an apparently cooperative
employer. It was to avoid this result that the additional duty of the
employer arose. Peremptory rejection of employee proposals was then held
improper, 4 as was unwillingness to reduce agreements reached to written
form. 5 In effect, the employer was said to be obliged to be open-minded
and to make reasonable efforts to come to an agreement.
On July 9, 1935, the National Labor Relations Board entered the
scene. It interpreted the decisions of the National Labor Board as having
the "sound principle that the employer is obligated by the statute to
negotiate in good faith with his employee's representatives, to match their
proposals, if unacceptable, with counter-proposals; and to make every
reasonable effort to reach an agreement." 6 This did not mean that the
employee representative was not obligated in like manner, but it must be
recalled that protection of these embyro employee organizations was a
paramount consideration at this time and they were always assumed to be
ready and willing to negotiate.
So the term good faith began its slow growth into a more definite
status. A logical subsequent step would have been for the Board to judge
the reasonableness of the employers' contentions and proposals on a theory
that failure to accept reasonable proposals and the making of unreasonable
counter-proposals would be evidence of intent not to agree, if not a show
of bad faith. But the Board stated that "the statute does not require
an employer to acquiesce in particular' demands." 7 Thus while willingness
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Act of February 28, 1920, c. 91, § 301, 41 Stat. 469.
In re International Association of Machinists, 2 R.L.B. 87, 89 (1921).
S. Dresner & Son, Dec. of the Nat. Labor Bd. 26 (Aug. 1933 - Mar. 1934).
Pierson Mfg. Co., Dec. of the Nat. Labor Bd. 53 (Aug. 1933. - Mar. 1934).
Houde Engineering Corp., Dec. of the Nat. Labor Rel. Bd. 35 (July 1934 - Dec. 1934).
Atlanta Hosiery Mills, Dec. of the Nat. Labor Rel. Bd. 144, 146 (July 1934 - Dec.
1934).
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and desire to reach an agreement are required, a failure to agree does not
necessarily indicate absence of the legally required state of mind.
The final legislative effort of the seventy-fourth Congress was the
enactment of the National Labor Relations Act, also known as the Wagner
Act.8 Again no appropriate statutory language was set out to serve as a
guide to the duty to bargain in good faith. A study of the more recent
legislation makes the reasons self-apparent; it simply can not be isolated
and defined in the stilted statutory terminology. The chore of definition redounded to the National Labor Relations Board and to the courts.
The National Labor Relations Board, prior to 1947, strove mightily
to keep its collective head above the mass of generalities as to what constituted this duty to bargain in good faith.9 The employer was to approach
the bargaining table with an open and fair mind with the thought of
finding a basis for agreement, yet the Act did not require an employer to
agree to particular terms. The resulting confusion was a natural concomitant of the legislative lack of definition.
For over a decade then, in the interim between 1935 and 1947, under
the terms of the Wagner Act it had been held to be unlawful for an
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees.' 10 This quoted provision had uniformly been construed to
require bargaining in good faith, which construction has now been expressly
confirmed by the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947. Under the
original Wagner Act no duty to bargain collectively rested on the employee
representative. The addition of Section 8 (b) (3) in the Taft-Hartley
amendments now imposes the obligation to bargain in good faith on labor
organizations as well as employees. The section follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
and its agents to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,
provided it is the representative of his employees. ....
11
Thus failure, of either the employer or the employee's representative to
bargain collectively is declared to be an unfair labor practice under the 1947
Act, Section 8 (a) (5) applying to the employer and the above quoted
Section 8 (b) (3) being applicable to the unions. Yet the obligation does
not "compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession."12
After having made it clear at the outset that the intention of the Act
was to impose upon the unions the same duty to bargain in good faith
which was imposed on the employers by the Wagner Act, the Board con8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Act of July 5, 1935, c. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 - 166 (1940 ed.).
"The indicia of good faith are notoriously elusive.
S. L. Allen & Co., 1
N.L.R.B. 714, 727 (1936).
Act of July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 8(5), 49 Stat. 453, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (5) (1940 ed.), as
amended by Act of June 23, 1947, c. 120, § 8 (5), 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (5)
(1952 ed.).
Act of June 23, 1947, c. 120, § 8(b) (3), 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1952
ed.).
Act of June 23, 1947, c. 120, § 8 (d), 61 Stat. 142, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1952 ed.).

NOTES

cluded that decisions of the Board and courts construing the employer's
duty to bargain under the Wagner Act were significant guideposts in
construing the new union duty to bargain.' 8
Little authority exists as to what is required of the unions, but the
foregoing points out that the cases involving employers, inconclusive as
they are, may be adapted as applicable to the unions. However, this
solution to the nature of the statutory duty to negotiate in good faith is
undercut with much fallacious reasoning.
REQUIREMENTS OF GOOD FAITH BARGAINING

When both parties have fulfilled all prior conditions in relation to
collective bargaining they approach the negotiation table under the
obligation "to participate actively in the deliberations so as to indicate a
present intention to find a basis for agreement, and a sincere effort must
be made to reach a common ground."' 14 It appears then that the Act is
complied with if negotiations occur even though no mutual agreement is
reached or an impasse results. The Act, in effect, would seem to impose
only the duty to bargain collectively with an honest, bona fide, openminded attitude coupled with an earnest effort to arrive at an agreement
if possible.
It is necessary to observe court and Board decisions that will aid in
interpreting the statutory obligations to bargain in "good faith." The
standards and tests set forth in Section 8 (d), applicable to both employers
and unions, closely paraphrase those established in decisions under the
Wagner Act.
Of course, the most flagrant single area of bad faith in the conducting
of bargaining is the outright refusal to negotiate. Let us, however, examine
some of the less obvious attempts to avoid the statutory duty of collective
bargaining in good faith. The Board has ruled that mere presence of the
employer in a meeting with representatives of the employees is insufficient
to constitute collective bargaining where no bona fide attempt to bargain
is present. In this case the union had been recognized as the bargaining
agent and sent a committee to the employer to demand better sanitary
facilities and working surroundings. The employer at first gave a curt
negative answer and then later realized the justice of the demands. He
acted on a few of the suggestions, not with an attitude of agreement or
collective bargaining but with one of acquiescence. Statements by the
employer made it clear that he would confer with union committees, but
only because that was what the law required. Also clear was the fact the
employer was indisposed to explore with an open mind the possibility of
making an agreement with its employees. The Board concluded that the
"employer refused to discuss the committee ideas or any detail of them
and made it clear that it had a fixed policy precluding such discussion.
13.
14.

National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948).
N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943).
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He thus refused in his dealings with his employees, to accede even to the
15
forms and the procedure of collective bargaining."'
In another more recent case it was held that there must be an open
mind and a sincere desire to reach an agreement in a spirit of amity and
cooperation. The contract in that instance was nearing termination and
negotiations were underway toward a new one when a snag arose as to
wage increases and a commercial fee clause. The contract terminated and
negotiation went on until suddenly the employer said he was opposed to
signing, saying he objected to third patries and outside elements and that
he was opposed to union activities and wanted to "get rid of them." This
was held an attitude incompatible with a good faith endeavor to reach an
understanding with the union. The union then offered the concession
of withdrawing the two noxious clauses if the employer would reopen
negotiations on a certain date. The employer rejected the offer saying it
would grant wage increases at a time when revenues warranted. The union
asked that he put "it in writing," showing their willingness to accept the
counterproposal, but the employer never replied. The failure to reply
showed absence of good faith. The Board touched on other elements of the
bargaining that failed to meet the good faith requirement. The employer's
attempt at trying to sign up the individual employees rather than going
through their bargaining representative was a "complete negation of the
principles of collective bargaining." Injection of new matters, not brought
up at a more appropriate earlier date, was held to be for the purpose of
keeping the parties from reaching agreement and thus further evidence of
lack of good faith. A demand for radical changes particularly at the
eleventh hour in the negotiations showed beyond any doubt the absence of
16
a sincere intention on the employer's part to reach an agreement.
Just as mere pretended bargaining will not suffice to constitute collective bargaining as contemplated by the Act, neither must the mind of the
employer be "heremetically sealed" against the thought of entering agreement. The holding here determined that the employer recognized he was
to bargain by law but he refused to agree to matters covering wages, rates
of pay and working conditions saying that was interfering with management. The employer also would not discuss scheduling of new rates
except after they were put in effect; he refused to discuss or make any
agreement as to overtime, Sunday or holiday labor, saying they were
already covered by law; he said he would not consider contractually binding himself against lockouts or agreements to arbitrate any differences that
might arise; and finally and boldly he maintained he would not make
counterproposals since it was against company principles. The Board
determined that there was a fixed intention not to agree to any proposal,
irrespective of whether the proposed terms were otherwise acceptable. Such
15.
16.

Timkin Silent Automatic Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 335, 342 (1936).
N.L.R.B. v. Woodruff, 193 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1952).

NoTEs
an attitude was a show of total want of good faith and made genuine
17
collective bargaining impossible.
Merely meeting with the employee representative to inform it that the
employer can not or will not change its position does not satisfy the Act's
requirements.' s Willingness of an employer to meet with the union
manifested in numerous conferences, is an indication of the required
attitude.' 9
A proper distinction was drawn in the case of N.L.R.B. v. Highland
Park Mfg. Co., 20 where the court stated the Act did not require that the
parties "agree" but did require that they "negotiate" with a view to
reaching an agreement if possible. The employer here had the discussions
postponed and later called off, taking the position that he had complied
with the requirement to bargain collectively inasmuch as his mill superintendent had conferred with the union's shop committee concerning
several specific grievances. The Board stated that mere discussion with the
employee's representative, with a fixed resolve on the part of the employer
not to enter into an agreement with them even regarding matters as to
2
which there is no dispute, does not satisfy the Act. '

Failure to divulge to the union certain of the management's records
of employment was ground for holding that the employer had failed to
cooperate whole-heartedly in collective bargaining. A question which
arose here was whether to negotiate for a flat wage rate or for wages
tailored to groups within the union that engaged in different levels of
skilled work. The union finally acceded to the latter and accord seemed
near until the employer said it would determine, as it always had, what the
wages and rates of pay would be. The employer did not want bargaining
but desired the former ex parte fixing of increases by the management.
The union requested employment records as to group pay rates in order to
compile a wage history of those to whom increases were granted. The
employer refused saying such material was confidential. Aside from the
above language the decision added that such matters may have been
confidential before the Act but could "not be held so in the face of the
22
expressed social and economic purposes of the Statute."
A limitation on the above holding was expressed nine years later in
the decision of N.L.R.B. v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co. 2 3 The union demanded, and the employer refused to divulge, the names, positions, and
current wages of the employees in the bargaining unit during the previous
year. The employer wanted to resort to a 1948 wage scale and yet would
not let the union see it while trying to formulate a 1949 wage scale. The
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

N.L.R.B.
N.L.R.B.
N.L.R.B.
110 F.2d
Ibid.
N.L.R.B.

v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1941).
v. Israel Putnam Mills, 197 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1952).
v. Norfolk Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Corp., 195 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1952).
632 (4th Cir. 1940).

23.

187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951).

v. Aluminum Ore Co., 131 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1942).
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decision stated that it was "difficult to conceive a case in which current or
immediately past wage rates would not be relevant during negotiations for
a minimum wage scale or for increased wages." 24 Only current or immediately past records were relevant and not the complete wage history as
demanded in the former case.
In another instance an employer had granted a wage increase in the
midst of negotiations and made it clear that the raise was not given as a
result of the efforts of the union. The employer was then asked by the
union if he would sign an agreement accepting certain other conditions of
employment if the union withdrew the demands for wage increases and a
closed shop. He stated that it was against company policy to sign an
agreement. It was held that "entering into negotiations for agreement
with the reservation not to reduce it to writing or sign it is conclusive of
25
bad faith bargaining."
The offering of counterproposals or suggestions has always been a
26
fertile area of contention. In the case of N.L.R.B. v. Globe Cotton Mills,
it was determined that the proffering of legitimate counterproposals by an
employer revealed evidence of good faith in bargaining. Although there
is authority to the contrary, 27 the complete failure to submit counterproposals is generally held as inconclusive evidence of a refusal to bargain 28
and if itis quite apparent from the union's position that counterproposals
would be useless, an employer's failure to make the gesture of submitting
them is not even indicative of bad faith. 29 It must be concluded that a
genuine counterproposal, without a shrouded motive or any hint of stalling
tactics, will be viewed as an integral step toward successful bargaining
relations.
The foregoing decisions have served to illustrate the many facets of
the problem and the impossibility of trying to describe every conceivable
type of bad faith in labor relations. However, in summary, a lack of good
faith may generally be inferred from evasions or stalling, refusal to consult,
unilateral action, misrepresentation, refusal to provide negotiators with
authority, refusal to furnish information, or interference with union activity. These and a host of other attitudes indicate conduct the law condemns as bad faith. This conduct is not to be considered individually but
must be observed in relation to the facts of both the present and any prior
negotiations. The role of factual findings and prior conduct is often
conclusive of the decision. As the Supreme Court of the United States has
aptly phrased it:
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 949.
N.L.R.B. v. Barrett Co., 135 F.2d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 1943).
103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939).
N.L.R.B. v. Rapid Roller Co., 126 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1942); Woodside Cotton Mills
Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 42 (1940).
N.L.R.B. v. Lightner Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1940).
N.L.R.B. v. Globe Cotton Mills, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939).

NOTES
Our role in such situations has special applicability to cases
where, as here, a statutory standard such as good faith can have
meaning only in its application to the particular facts of a particular case. 30
STATUS OF THE MUTUAL OBLIGATION TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

One of the primary failings of the original Wagner Act was its characterization as "pro-union." It developed a one-sidedness whereby the
union could advance its objectives at the bargaining table and then sit
back to watch the employer try to sidestep the more unreasonable demands
and still avoid the stigma of an unfair labor practice. The statutory
recognition of the mutual character of the obligation is a provision of the
Taft-Hartley Act. 31 It was said that it removed the complaint of favoring
the unions. Yet in examining the Board and court authority presented
above it still seems evident that the duty to collectively bargain in good
faith rests more heavily upon the employer. Only rarely has union willingness to freely discuss and justify position been -questioned.
In N.L.R.B. v. American National Ins. Co.,32 where the employer was
bargaining for a management function clause as a counter proposal to the
union demand for unlimited arbitration, it was held by the United States
Supreme Court that this did not constitute a refusal to bargain in good
faith but the employer's unilateral action in changing working conditions
during negotiations was held to be a departure from good faith bargaining.
Observing this result then, it would seem logical to conclude that if the
employee representative also engaged in such unilateral action during
bargaining it too would breach the requirement. And in effect, it was so
33
held by the Board in PersonalProducts Corporation.
The union-employer
meetings had resulted in deadlock and without further specific demands
the union members engaged in slow downs, walk-outs, partial strikes for
portions of a shift or an entire shift and refusal to work overtime. This
might fairly be construed as a unilateral change in working conditions by
the union. The Board held that the union indulged in these tactics while
purporting to confer in good faith and they had interfered with production
and visited strong economic pressure on the employer. The Board thought
it clear that such unprotected harassing tactics were an abuse of the union's
bargaining power and irreconcilable with the purposes of the Act. However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 34 set the Board
finding aside, asserting that there was not the slightest inconsistency between
a genuine desire to come to an agreement and use of these economic
pressures to get the type of agreement one wants. Since a total strike would
not have been evidence of bad faith, no such inference could be drawn
from a partial withholding of services at that time.
30.

N.L.R.B. v. American National Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 410, 72 S.Ct. 824, 832, 96
L.Ed. 1027, 1040

31.
32.
33.
34.

(1952).

See text at note 10 supra.
Supra note 30.
108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954).
227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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CONCLUSION

The Taft-Hartley Act attempts to create an atmosphere and an attitude in which an agreement is inevitable. It does not compel agreement;
and yet under present decisions are not the employers compelled, in effect,
constantly to yield more ground to the union demands? This is a harsh
inquiry that must receive fair attention by the Board and federal courts.
Legislation over the state of mind of employer or union is impossible; thus
it is imperative that the over-all conduct in negotiation be used and compared with that of those negotiators who have accepted collective bargaining as a workable postulate in daily industrial living. This application
would supplement the administrative and judicial interpretations standing
alone and would serve to halt the threatened pressures on the employer.
The emphasis in successful labor-management relations must continue
to lie on the process of good faith collective bargaining in order to safeguard not only the legitimate interests of labor unions, but also those of
employers, individual employees, and, of primary import, the American
public, whose stake in the process of collective bargaining is of great
importance.
The Act now requires that both parties act in good faith in bargaining
and also provides remedies for failure to perform in that manner, but the
Congress, the National Labor Relations Board, and the courts must continue to contribute definiteness to the term to better enable those gathered
around the bargaining table to interpret it.
Administrative and judicial regulation of the collective bargaining
procedure into predetermined channels is certainly not a wholesome
solution. Should it ever become possible for the unions or management to
simply present themselves before the Board at any instance of balkiness
on the part of a bargaining opponent, it would lead to destruction of the
very negotiation the Act was promulgated to protect. Harmonious labor
relations are the natural result of accepted standards or policies tempered
with a spirit of mutual trust, good-will and respect, all of which aid in
giving underlying sustenance to the rather naked statutory term "good
faith."
ALAN K. SIMPSON

A COMMENT ON WYOMING'S NEW ACCOUNTS
RECEIVABLE STATUTE
The Wyoming Legislature in 1957, keeping pace with the prospective
commercial development of the state, adopted a new act relating to the
The legislation endeavors to make
assignment of accounts receivable.'
the practice of accounts receivable financing more useful by eliminating
1.

Wyo. Comp. Stat.

§§

39-1401 to 39-1416 (Supp. 1957).

